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The fiscal federalism has got more and more attention. Our country’s fiscal 
federalism is still in the process of development, and there’s always the consideration of 
power taking-in or putting away when dealing with the central-local relationships. The 
rent-seeking activities arise in the situation of incomplete market economy while the 
definition of different authorities is inexplicit. The different fiscal federalism have 
different influences on the rent-seeking activities, and the rent-seeking activities in turn 
affect the economic development and the reform process of fiscal system. The 
superficial reason of rent-seeking is the benefit pursing, while the reason behind it is the 
unclear property rights and government functions and other reasons on the aspect of 
system, and the deep reason of rent-seeking is the negligence of the thought of equality 
and reasonable rights. Decentralization may stimulate local governments to lend the 
helping hand, but the administrative decentralization lacks the effective constraint from 
market to keep down the rent-seeking. Only the fiscal federalism with the moderate 
market-oriented decentralization may effectively keep down the rent-seeking activities 
and promote the economic growth, and in materially promote centralization and national 
unification. In the paper, we discuss the emergence, form change and reasons and other 
relative subjects of rent-seeking in the fiscal federalism, and propose the measurement 
of rent-seeking activities and suggestions on the moderate fiscal decentralization. 
The main contents include the following five major parts. 
The first chapter is devoted to the theory of rent-seeking and development of fiscal 
federalism, and the brief introduction of the problem of rent-seeking in the fiscal 
federalism. 
The second chapter is concerned with the emergence of the rent-seeking in our 
country’s fiscal federalism. We introduce the process of establishment and development 
of our country’s fiscal federalism, and also show the emergence and performance of 
rent-seeking and different ways of rent-seeking because of different fiscal 














The third chapter is devoted to reasons of the rent-seeking in our country’s fiscal 
federalism. Besides the subjective motives of rent-seeking activities, the objective 
reasons exist. It is the imperfect market economy and the fiscal federalism that give way 
to rent-seeking activities, which are induced by the unclear government-market and 
intergovernmental relationships and the defects in supervision and management. 
Fundamentally speaking, the negligence of the idea of equality and of the appeal of 
reasonable rights caused the spread of rent-seeking. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the discussion that moderate fiscal 
decentralization is the effective way to contain rent-seeking and corruption and to 
promote centralization and unification. The moderate market-oriented fiscal 
decentralization which is the requirement of containment of rent-seeking may cause the 
transformation of government from the helping hand to the grabbing hand. The fiscal 
decentralization doesn’t cause separation inevitably; on the contrary, it can promote 
centralization and stability. The above details will be carried on in the part. 
In the fifth chapter, the countermeasures of rent-seeking activities and suggestions 
on fiscal decentralization are discussed. Rent-seeking activities take place for the 
intervention of government in the market; however, government’s intervention is 
indispensable to avoid the market failure. There are a lot of shortcomings of our fiscal 
systems at present which give way to rent-seeking activities, so it is necessary to reform 
the fiscal federalism based on the real market economy system, and to establish the 
democratic fiscal federalism ruled by law. 
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